



















This study presents a reinterpretation of Japan’s official responses toward China’s 
pressure over the Yasukuni issue from 1985 to 2007.  
 
In the current literature of Sino-Japanese relations, the Yasukuni controversy has 
often been regarded as being influenced by unique factors within the bilateral relations. 
It is generally taken for granted that Japan’s official responses to China’s pressure 
over the Yasukuni issue are determined by individual, social-ideological and foreign 
strategic factors. This study emphasizes that these conventional interpretations do not 
provide a forward-looking and internally consistent account to the variation of Japan’s 
responses to China’s pressure over the issue. The author particularly seeks to answer 
why some Japanese Prime Ministers, such as Nakasone Yasuhiro, Hashimoto Ryutaro 
and Abe Shinzo, who had consistently advocated the official visit to the Yasukuni 
Shrine, complied with China’s pressure after they took office, but not Koizumi 
Junichiro, who had not been enthusiastic over the Yasukuni visits prior to taking 
office.  
 
This study introduces an alternative interpretation of Japan’s official responses 
toward China’s pressure over the Yasukuni issue by applying a political survival 
approach. It argues that the domestic political legitimacy of an individual leader or the 
ruling party is a vital factor that determines Japan’s official responses to China’s 
pressure over the Yasukuni issue. I demonstrate that such a fundamental rational 
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calculation on how to respond to China’s pressure, by spontaneously calculating the 
cost-benefit utility, with regard to office-seeking in domestic politics existed within the 
Nakasone administration in 1985-86. A stable domestic support to the Nakasone 
administration constituted a precondition for Nakasone to make decisions based on his 
individual preference. I also demonstrate that such a calculation existed within the 
Hashimoto administration in 1996. As the central executive of a coalition government, 
Hashimoto faced furious objections from both ruling parties: the Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP). A concession toward China’s 
demand would not undermine Hashimoto’s political survival in the domestic table, but 
would contribute to the stability of the coalition government and the LDP’s campaign 
for the upcoming election. Finally, I demonstrate that both the Koizumi and Abe 
administrations between 2001 and 2007 responded to Chinese pressure over the 
Yasukuni issue based on a similar domestic calculation with a more assertive approach. 
Suffering from weak support within the LDP in terms of traditional faction power at 
the beginning of his term, Koizumi strategically utilized the Yasukuni issue gradually 
by demonstrating a resolute stance against China’s pressure. This stance, in return, 
helped Koizumi seek potential political allies within the LDP and maintain high levels 
of public support. The Yasukuni problem was politicized and linked to the political 
survival of Koizumi and his long term blueprint on domestic structural reform. 
Similarly, Abe strategically utilized the Yasukuni issue for consolidating the foundation 
of his domestic political survival. By complying with China’s demand in an ambiguous 
manner, Abe was able to improve the deteriorating bilateral relations caused by 
Koizumi’s annual Yasukuni visits. This policy change, in return, helped avoid liberal 
criticism within the LDP during the presidential election in 2006 and helped him 
consolidate his superiority within the LDP by gaining further public support. 
 
This study’s findings also demonstrate the broader applicability of the political 
survival approach developed in the theoretical field of international relations (IR) 
studies. Japan has often been treated as a unique country in terms of historical and 
cultural characteristics. This study, by contrast, implies that Japanese prime ministers 
act just like national leaders in any other countries, responding toward foreign pressure 
by calculating costs and benefits in terms of domestic political survival.  
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